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Abstract
Organization theory seems to be caught between a rock and a hard place: on the one 
hand, there are arguments that the field is too preoccupied with theory, leaving its work 
abstract and practically irrelevant. On the other hand, there are arguments that the field 
is overly empirical and too methods-driven, which hampers the creation of ideas that 
resonate with constituencies beyond the organization studies community. How to resolve 
this apparent conundrum? In this essay we argue that neither more theorizing nor more 
forensic data-driven work might address the problem; rather, and perhaps surprisingly, 
we propose that a philosophical stance might offer a remedy. The aim of this essay is (1) 
to explore thought experiments as a genuine philosophical method that is designed to 
develop promising ideas and concepts and (2) to reflect on how such conceptual work 
can help shape organization theory to be conceptually more stimulating and practically 
more relevant. We argue that this particular kind of conceptual work has been and should 
continue to be one of the hallmarks of organization theory. Thus thought experiments 
represent a valuable methodological extension of our toolkit as they provide crucial devices 
triggering transformations in thought and practice.
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2 Organization Theory 
One must experiment with ideas!
Georg Christoph Lichtenberg, The Waste Books 
(1793/1990)
Introduction
In recent years, organization theory has been 
facing mounting criticism. For instance, sen-
ior figures such as Stephen Barley argue that 
‘organizational theory is facing a kind of exis-
tential crisis’ (Barley, 2016, p. 2). He laments 
that organization theory has focused on devel-
oping ‘novel new theory’ which ‘has become 
an empty exercise’. Indeed, much of the theo-
rizing in the so-called top journals resembles 
‘catalogues of spare parts for a machine they 
never build’ (Beninger, 1986, p. 105; quoting 
George Miller). Several critical voices argue 
that organization theory has lost its object (du 
Gay, 2015) and with it, its relevance (Carter & 
Spence, 2019). Hence organization theory 
seems practically irrelevant and increasingly 
its place in the business school is questioned: 
‘Where do we fit in the business-school 
world?’, Barley (2016, p. 3) asks rhetorically. 
Adding insult to injury, he argues that organi-
zation theory is mute with regard to emerging 
alternatives to traditional businesses, such as 
the ‘sharing economy, networks of smaller 
firms, cooperatives, and the gig economy’ 
(Barley, 2016, p. 3).
It seems that organization theory is caught 
between a rock and a hard place; on the one 
hand, there are arguments that the field is too 
preoccupied with theory, which makes it too 
slow to adjust to new phenomena. On the other 
hand, there are arguments that the field is overly 
empirical and too methods-driven, which ham-
pers the creation of ideas that resonate with 
constituencies beyond the organization studies 
community. In response to this criticism, schol-
ars have developed a series of proposals includ-
ing a focus on ‘grand challenges’ (Eisenhardt, 
Graebner, & Sonenshein, 2016; Ferraro, Etzion, 
& Gehman, 2015; George, Howard-Grenville, 
Joshi, & Tihanyi, 2016; Mintzberg, Etzion, & 
Mantere, 2018) and tackling broader societal 
issues such as inequality (e.g. Amis, Mair, & 
Munir, 2020).
The ‘dehydration’ of organization theory can 
be traced back to a general lack of appreciation 
for the imaginative and processual aspect of 
theorizing. When a theoretical contribution 
tends to be conceived of as a ‘thing’, built out of 
constructs, propositions and models (Bacharach, 
1989; Eisenhardt, 1989; Whetten, 1989), the 
processes of reasoning and imagination that led 
to those outcomes are left at the roadside after 
the arguments have been accepted (Ketokivi, 
Mantere, & Cornelissen, 2017). Karl Weick 
(1995; see also Alvesson & Sandberg, 2011) 
expressed this sentiment in the words ‘what 
theory is not, theorizing is’.
In this paper we propose that a philosophi-
cal stance could address some of these issues. 
We examine thought experiments, perhaps the 
most characteristic method of philosophical 
inquiry, as a means to develop ‘thick con-
cepts’ (Ryle, 2009; Abend, 2019) with the 
potential to reinvigorate organization theory. 
Our essay suggests that thought experiments 
are practical ways to develop new ideas. Thus, 
thought experiments represent a valuable 
methodological extension of our toolkit as 
they can provide crucial devices triggering 
transformations in thought and practice while 
opening and retaining the pathways of reason-
ing that generated them. The aim of this paper 
is to explore thought experiments as a genuine 
philosophical method for organizational 
research and reflect on how such conceptual 
work can help shape organization theory to be 
conceptually more stimulating and practically 
more relevant.
How to do Philosophy 
in Organization Theory: 
Thought Experiments
Thought experiments have a long tradition; 
Plato’s famous cave in which we humans are 
trapped represented a thought experiment that 
was designed to convey the truth about truth. 
Equally, scientists have drawn on thought 
experiments to set up their claims or upset those 
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of others. But only since the inaugural confer-
ence at the University of Pittsburgh on Thought 
Experiments in Science and Philosophy in 
1986, engagement with the nature and function 
of thought experiments began to grow rapidly 
(Horowitz & Massey, 1991; Sorensen, 1998). 
This interest sparked a rediscovery of earlier 
contributions to thought experiments by promi-
nent scientists such as Mach, Bohr, Einstein, 
Heisenberg and Kuhn. As Mach already argued 
at the dawn of the 19th century, thought experi-
ments ‘led to enormous changes in our thinking 
and to an opening up of most important new 
paths of inquiry’ (Mach, 1897/1976, p. 138). 
Indeed, since thought experiments were first 
mentioned in 1811 by Danish natural scientist 
and philosopher Hand Christian Ørsted, many 
disciplines have made use of them to advance 
their knowledge (see Brown, 2011; Kühne, 
2005;Sorensen, 1998).
Based on Gendler (1998, 2010) we define 
thought experiments as judgements about what 
would be the case if what is being played out in 
an imagined scenario were real. Perhaps the 
most famous thought experiment was under-
taken by Galilei who challenged Aristoteles’ 
claim that heavy objects fall faster than light 
ones. He set up the following thought experi-
ment: according to Aristoteles, a light musket 
ball falls more slowly than a heavy cannon ball. 
Now imagine you link them together and throw 
them out of the window: what happens? The 
musket ball falls more slowly, and hence should 
act as a drag on the cannon ball, slowing it 
down. However, as they are joined together, 
they form a heavier object, hence they should 
fall faster. Obviously, something isn’t quite 
right here – and that must be the assumption 
that bodies with different weights fall with dif-
ferent speeds (see Brown, 2011).
In natural sciences, thought experiment rose 
to prominence through Einstein’s train and plat-
form thought experiment; Schrödinger’s cat 
with which he demonstrated that the uncertainty 
principle cannot be limited to micro-level phe-
nomena; Heisenberg and his gamma ray micro-
scope. To add a further example, Darwin’s 
Origin of Species relies heavily on thought 
experiments with which Darwin explored his 
‘theory’s capabilities’ (Lennox, 1991, p. 241); 
he used a series of ‘imaginary illustrations’ (as 
he put it) to make his point about the origin of 
species and to suggest the explanatory potential 
of his theory.1
In moral philosophy and political theory, 
ethicists such as John Rawls devised thought 
experiments that had massive impact as well; 
his ‘veil of ignorance’ is a thought experiment 
that exposes key questions concerning justice – 
a thought experiment that economist and Nobel 
Laureate Tirole has picked up again recently 
(2017, p. 2). Many ethical debates – such as the 
trolley analogy2 – are based on thought experi-
ments, as are more general philosophical 
debates (from Wittgenstein’s beetle in a box to 
Nagel’s bat).3 In political science and history, 
Tetlock and Belkin’s Counterfactual Thought 
Experiments in World Politics (1996) demon-
strated the productive role of thought experi-
ments for the social sciences. Economics in 
particular is deeply engaged in thought experi-
ments. Adam Smith lay the foundation for the 
Wealth of Nations in his pin factory example – 
which was set up not as empirical data but as a 
thought experiment which outlines how an eco-
nomic system based on the division of labour 
contributes to productivity and wealth. Smith’s 
reference to the invisible hand is another exam-
ple of his principled imagination. Ever since 
Smith, thought experiments have remained an 
important part of economics; from Keynes’s 
famous beauty contest to illuminate the paradox 
of stock market prediction to various Robinson 
Crusoe island experiments, game theory (e.g. 
the prisoner’s dilemma) and beyond. Economic 
theory has a long tradition of deploying thought 
experiments to further its theorizing.
In organization theory, thought experiments 
seem important yet they are rarely theorized 
(Cornelissen & Durand, 2014; Folger & Turillo, 
1999). Exceptions include the writings of Weick 
(1989, p. 519) who claimed that when ‘theorists 
build theory, they design, conduct, and interpret 
imaginary experiments’. Or take the example in 
Simon’s (1991) much cited paper Organizations 
and Markets. In the section on ‘Ubiquity of 
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Organization’ Simon makes his central argu-
ment with the following thought experiment:
A mythical visitor from Mars, not having been 
apprised of the centrality of markets and contracts, 
might find the new institutional economics rather 
astonishing. Suppose that it (the visitor, I’ll avoid 
the question of its sex) approaches the Earth from 
space, equipped with a telescope that reveals social 
structures. The firms reveal themselves, say, as 
solid green areas with faint interior contours 
marking out divisions and departments. Market 
transactions show as red lines connecting firms, 
forming a network in the spaces between them. 
Within firms (and perhaps even between them) the 
approaching visitor also sees pale blue lines, the 
lines of authority connecting bosses with various 
levels of workers. As our visitor looked more 
carefully at the scene beneath, it might see one of 
the green masses divide, as a firm divested itself of 
one of its divisions. Or it might see one green object 
gobble up another. At this distance, the departing 
golden parachutes would probably not be visible.
No matter whether our visitor approached the 
United States or the Soviet Union, urban China or 
the European Community, the greater part of the 
space below it would be within the green areas, 
for almost all of the inhabitants would be 
employees, hence inside the firm boundaries. 
Organizations would be the dominant feature of 
the landscape. A message sent back home, 
describing the scene, would speak of ‘large green 
areas interconnected by red lines.’ It would not 
likely speak of ‘a network of red lines connecting 
green spots.’ [. . .]. When our visitor came to 
know that the green masses were organizations 
and the red lines connecting them were market 
transactions, it might be surprised to hear the 
structure called a market economy. ‘Wouldn’t 
“organizational economy” be the more 
appropriate term?’ it might ask. The choice of 
name may matter a great deal. The name can 
affect the order in which we describe its 
institutions, and the order of description can 
affect the theory. In particular, it may strongly 
affect our choice of the variables that are 
important enough to be included in a first-order 
theory of the phenomena. How does the economy 
look when it is viewed as an organizational 
economy, with market relations among 
organizations? (Simon, 1991, pp. 27–8)
Simon’s example is significant because it 
highlights how thought experiments work, how 
they function and where their limitations lie. A 
thought experiment such as Simon’s is situated 
between ‘empirical facts’ and ‘philosophical 
speculation’ (Mach, 1897/1976). By definition, 
it is not geared towards discovering new infor-
mation about empirical reality; the thought 
experiment happens in the head of the researcher 
(or perhaps within the walls of a seminar room) 
– but it does not include new data collection. 
Thus Kuhn (1964) asked the decisive question: 
given its closure towards the empirical world, 
how can we learn something – anything, really 
– new about the world through thought experi-
ments? If Simon’s visitor from Mars does not 
reveal anything empirically grounded about the 
world we live in, what can it possibly teach us? 
This is the ‘central puzzle’ (Gendler, 2010) of 
the thought experimental situation.
The creative and critical functions of 
thought experiments
Putting the puzzle together, we may well start 
with the edges and define what a thought exper-
iment is not. It is by no means a replacement for 
empirical research; nor is it an experiment that 
could be conducted in reality but it is either too 
expensive, too complex or morally too contro-
versial to be actually done. Nor is a thought 
experiment simply a domestic affair in which 
scientists prepare an inventory of their concep-
tual apparatus and check for any contradictions 
or redundancies in their vocabulary. Thought 
experiments, we argue, are more than just the 
manipulation of thought: thought experiments 
teach us about our ideas and the world. How 
can that be the case?
Kuhn argues that thought experiments ‘give 
the scientist access to information which is 
simultaneously at hand and yet somehow inac-
cessible to him’ (Kuhn, 1964, p. 261). Indeed, 
we know about the ingredients in Simon’s 
thought experiment – we know about firms, 
markets, employment, hierarchy and capital-
ism’s liberal claims. But as Simon’s thought 
experiment suggests, somehow we have not 
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fully grasped the meaning of these ideas and 
how they shape our assumptions and theories 
about the world. What Simon points out is an 
anomaly – something strange or odd, something 
that exists right in front of our eyes, yet we have 
a difficult time making sense of it; or, in Simon’s 
case, we would have a difficult time explaining 
it to an outsider. Kuhn argues that it is in these 
moments of anomaly or ‘crisis’ where the 
thought experiment is most useful:
A crisis induced by the failure of expectation 
and followed by a revolution is at the heart of the 
thought-experimental situation we have been 
examining. Conversely, thought experiment is 
one of the essential analytical tools which are 
employed during crisis and which then help to 
promote basic conceptual reform. (Kuhn, 1964, 
p. 263)
For Kuhn this is the epistemological place 
for the thought experiment: it dwells on exist-
ing knowledge of the world but through expos-
ing it to the experimental situation, estranges 
the familiar and makes visible tensions, con-
tradictions and anomalies that are the fuel for 
new theorizing:
[. . .] the analytical thought experimentation that 
bulks so large in the writings of Galileo, Einstein, 
Bohr, and others is perfectly calculated to expose 
the old paradigm to existing knowledge in ways 
that isolate the root of crisis with a clarity 
unattainable in the laboratory. (Kuhn, 1962/2012, 
p. 88)
Based on this characterization we can distil 
two specific functions of the thought experi-
ment – a creative function and a critical func-
tion. The creative function describes the 
capacity of thought experiments to generate, 
demonstrate and communicate new ideas. 
Ørsted (in Kühne, 2005, p. 135) argued for the 
‘generative’ nature of thought experiments 
which is expressed in open-ended scenarios that 
are designed to make people reflect. Take for 
instance the above-mentioned thought experi-
ment by Rawls in which he assumes a ‘veil of 
ignorance’; his thought experiment does not 
suggest an answer nor does it provide specific 
information about how to answer it; rather, it 
problematizes an issue and ‘throws new light 
but no new information’ on the scenario at hand 
(to paraphrase Ryle, 2009). Simon’s experiment 
works in the same way; it opens up space for 
reflection and invites debate about current theo-
rizing. His example demonstrates the heuristic 
function of thought experiments. As Hempel 
(1952, in Kühne, 2005, p. 325) argued, thought 
experiments serve such a heuristic function in 
that they ‘suggest’ one or more hypotheses that 
need further testing. This function stresses that 
thought experiments are – like experiments in a 
laboratory – tools for search and discovery; 
they are set up to explore possibilities, not cal-
culate probabilities. Here we see how a thought 
experiment is a device to explore a ‘theory’s 
capabilities’ as argued above (with Darwin as 
example). This function also stresses the com-
municative aspect of thought experiments: 
Lakatos (1976) argued that, in Greek, the term 
‘thought experiment’ (deiknymi) means ‘to 
make visible’.
Following this meaning, thought experi-
ments are demonstrations of an idea that aim 
to mobilize others and make them question 
the status quo. The Einstein–Bohr debate 
about quantum mechanics is a good example. 
Through thought experiments the two scien-
tists developed a narrative that the public 
could engage with. Another example is the 
notion of ‘Anthropocene’, where a future 
geologist, perhaps an alien, perceives the 
short life-span of post-agricultural Homo 
sapiens as a geological epoch comparable to 
the mass extinctions such as the one that 
caused the death of the dinosaurs (see Hoffman 
& Jennings, 2018). Thus, thought experiments 
are ‘devices of framing and persuasion’ 
(Gendler, 2010) that embody an aesthetic 
quality which helps the communication of 
often complex scientific debates (Ichikawa & 
Jarvis, 2009). Thought experiments are 
designed to show something, to reveal some-
thing that is of interest yet has been neglected 
or simply overlooked. One can easily grasp 
the potential implications for organization 
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theory; if thought experiments generate, dem-
onstrate and communicate new ideas, then 
organization theory would be well served to 
develop thought experiments. It would pro-
vide valuable heuristic insights and allow 
communication of its core ideas to a non-
expert audience. Such work should not replace 
more traditional scholarly work, but rather be 
complementary to it.
The second, critical function is equally 
important. This function stresses the capacity of 
thought experiments to problematize existing 
theories by showing their limitations, unfore-
seen implications or taken-for-granted assump-
tions. Popper (1959) developed this critical 
function of the thought experiment (or as he 
says: imaginary experiment) as a tool to inves-
tigate whether theories account for all their 
implications and consider possible unintended 
consequences in depth. The thought experiment 
is a critical testing of assumptions, much like 
the checking of theoretical ‘monsters’ that 
Lakatos (1976) talked about. Thought experi-
ments have a specific ‘justificatory force’ 
because they call upon the experimenter to 
‘constructively participate’, as Gendler put it 
(2010, pp. 38–41); this force is based on a 
thought experiment’s ‘capacity to make availa-
ble in a theoretical way those tacit practical 
commitments that enable us to negotiate the 
physical world’ (Gendler, 2010, p. 40). Inherent 
in this critical function is a thought experiment-
er’s aim to prove (or disprove) a specific point. 
Here thought experiments are set up to facilitate 
a decision that closes a specific debate. An 
example is Galileo who wanted to close the 
chapter on Aristotelian physics and move on to 
a new one (that he could write; see above). This 
critical role of the thought experiment is also 
about communication but with the intention to 
defend or attack an existing idea. Again, this 
critical capacity should be much welcome in 
organization theory as it complements other 
modes of critical inquiry; thought experiments 
make available tacit practical commitments, 
invite third parties to ‘constructively partici-
pate’ (Gendler, 2010) and seek to take a stance, 
or even make a decision, on a given issue.
Metaphor, analogy and fiction 
as building blocks for thought 
experiments
Cooper (2005, p. 20) notes that ‘a thought 
experimenter manipulates her world view in 
accord with the “what if” questions posed by a 
thought experiment. When all necessary 
manipulations are carried through the result is 
either a consistent model, or contradiction.’ A 
thought experiment thus involves the repre-
sentation of a ‘world’, or in other words, a 
plausible state of affairs; it is an experiment 
with things known. In Simon’s thought experi-
ment we do not encounter flying saucers or 
money trees – only a Martian, and even includ-
ing such an unknown creature, the set-up of 
the experiment sounds pretty familiar.
This begs the question: What is such a 
‘world’ and what is the condition for the ‘what 
if’ to be thought-experimental, and not merely 
fictional? Cooper likens thought experiments to 
‘models’, such as those used in natural science. 
Yet, this may be too limiting, as models may 
imply the necessity of expressing causal laws or 
systemic relationships that predict behaviour as 
modelled. While this notion might apply to at 
least most of the thought experiments con-
ducted in the natural sciences, it leaves out a 
host of thought experiments conducted in phi-
losophy and the humanities; Thomas Nagel’s 
exploration of conscious experience by asking 
what it is like to be a bat; or John Rawls’ explo-
ration of a just society by examining what indi-
viduals shrouded by a veil of ignorance could 
agree on are just two among many influential 
thought experiments that are not models but 
scenarios, or narratives of disciplined imagina-
tion. This notion of disciplined imagination is 
central to Weick’s (1989) conception of new 
theory generation as an evolutionary process, 
where ‘thought trials’ are conducted to find 
solutions to core problems (‘variation’), the 
solutions being intersubjectively interrogated 
(‘selection’), with successful ones passing into 
the body of knowledge (‘retention’).
In contrast to this evolutionary model, 
thought experiments have fluid boundaries to 
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other modes of inquiry. Mach (1897/1976) 
wrote that the dreamer, the novelist, the poet 
of technical or social utopias but also the mer-
chant, the researcher and the inventor work 
with thought experiments to think through the 
relation between circumstances, actions and 
possible consequences. In the comprehensive 
Routledge Companion to Thought Experiments 
(2018) Stuart, Fehige and Brown argue simi-
larly that thought experiments do not play a 
role only in science but also in art. They posit 
that for instance Jackson Pollock’s paintings 
or George Orwell’s Animal Farm are basically 
thought experiments. Without engaging in a 
discussion about the merit of such a wide defi-
nition, we want to clarify the relation between 
thought experiments and other modes of 
inquiry that may be used productively in 
organization theory.
While models are not a necessary aspect of 
every thought experiment, analogies are core 
components to any thought experiment (Cooper, 
2005). For instance, in examining disruptive 
strategies for firms, Gary Hamel (1996, p. 71) 
conducts the following thought experiment:
Consider the hotel industry’s definition of a day, 
which begins when you check in and ends at noon 
when you check out. But if you check in at 1 A.M. 
after a gruelling journey, why should you check 
out at the same time or pay the same amount as a 
person who arrived 5 P.M. the previous afternoon? 
If a rental car company can manage a fleet of cars 
on a rotating 24-hour basis, why can’t a hotel do 
exactly the same with a fleet of rooms?
With this rather simple thought experiment, 
Hamel teases out a specific disruptive strategy 
for the hospitality industry. The thought experi-
ment works with analogical induction, listing 
connections between two different business 
models (Ketokivi et al., 2017).
In theorizing, thought experiments tend to be 
more complex than the simple example from a 
paragraph of Hamel’s paper. A thought experi-
ment explains something abstract and complex 
by comparing it with something simpler and 
tractable, and explores what those similarities 
would entail. Foucault’s appropriation of 
Bentham’s panopticon allows him to discuss a 
theme as abstract and pervasive as power in a 
single, relatively simple thought experiment: 
what if the panopticon was the blueprint for 
19th-century society? This is reasoning by anal-
ogy, which can take many logical forms: induc-
tion, deduction or abduction, or often a mix of 
several of them (Ketokivi et al., 2017). Such 
similarities reveal blind spots or problems, or 
generate new possibilities for thought.
A thought experiment fully explores an anal-
ogy by examining all of its perceived main 
implications. In the language of analogical rea-
soning, the thought experiment looks at the 
connectedness between two domains of mean-
ing (Ketokivi et al., 2017). The generativity of 
analogical reasoning rests not only on the simi-
larity between two domains but also on their 
dissimilarity; the range of main connections is 
not infinite. Car rental services and hotels may 
share the property of offering temporally lim-
ited services to their clients, but their similarity 
is more salient in pricing services by duration 
rather than, say value-added services. In hotels 
these involve kitchens and gyms whereas in car 
rental these involve child seats and insurance. 
Infinite connections are not necessary for a suc-
cessful analogy, but a number of them is.
In addition to analogies, thought experi-
ments use devices from literary fiction. While 
the metaphor (a form of figurative language 
often found in fiction) and analogies are closely 
related (Gentner, Holyoak, & Kokinov, 2001), 
thought experiments often venture beyond just 
metaphor. Thought experiments are in one 
sense experiments of ‘miniature worldmaking’ 
(Goodman, 1978), where reasoning is based on 
a detailed sketch of a situation, which is then 
used as an analogy of a broader theme. In 
worldmaking, we construct an alternative real-
ity that helps us understand, explain or experi-
ence something to which we have previously 
not had access (Goodman, 1978); in this sense 
there exists a continuity between the work of 
scientists with that of artists and writers. 
Worldmaking organizes entities into relational 
structures, gives entities asymmetric weights, 
puts them into temporal order, creates and 
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deconstructs existing entities and abstracts 
(‘deforms’) properties and relationships 
(Goodman, 1978). All of these devices may be 
useful for those conducting thought experi-
ments; modellers may rely more on structure 
and weight, while narrators work more with 
temporal order. All need an ontology of objects 
and relations, and ways of abstracting out and 
focusing in.
Narrative fiction provides a helpful contrast 
to modelling as a methodology for thought 
experiments. While a model is a possible world 
defined by a set of laws or rules, a fictional 
example is a plausible and coherent story that 
complies with narrative causality rather than 
nomological causality (Polkinghorne, 1988). 
Asking what it is like to be a bat (as Nagel did 
in his 1974 paper) examines a narrative sce-
nario, inviting the reader to empathize with the 
condition of a bat, appreciating the diversity of 
conscious experience, and the limitations of 
anthropocentric definitions of consciousness. 
Techniques that fictional authors use to con-
struct characters and situations involve empa-
thy (‘what would it feel to be this character’) 
and principled imagination, yet they remain 
empirical.
In sum, thought experiments open up new 
space for organizational research. Critically, 
thought experiments expose flaws in existing 
theorizations (Ghoshal, 2005) and, simultane-
ously, they help to go beyond existing 
approaches of theorizing and disclose new 
worlds (Goodman, 1978). Thus thought experi-
ments represent a powerful tool to rejuvenate 
organization theory as ‘miniature world-mak-
ing’ through experiments which engage with 
ideas holistically.
Designing a Thought 
Experiment
This begs the question: how to design a thought 
experiment? A thought experiment requires an 
analogy which facilitates asking several 
‘what if’ questions. The selection of an analogy 
is guided by the problem-setting. For 
instance, William Ouchi (1980) explored how 
organizations could handle situations where 
performance measurement is hard, and goal 
incongruence was necessary. Classical theory 
of the firm identifies two main forms of organi-
zation: markets and hierarchical bureaucracies, 
which cannot handle high levels of ambiguity in 
performance measurement. Ouchi selects the 
analogy of an organization as a clan, and 
explores how clans accomplish high levels of 
goal congruence between their members. 
Drawing on sociological knowledge about 
clans, Ouchi essentially asks several questions 
in the form of ‘what if an organization was like 
a clan?’ As a result, he delivers an account of 
three main organizational forms, classified by 
the forms of control that they exert on their 
members.
The necessary first step in a thought experi-
ment is, then, a problem formulation, such as 
the one suggested by Ouchi in his clan control 
paper. In some cases, the thought experiment is 
conducted in an effort to shed light on phenom-
ena where theory does not yet exist (the creative 
or generative function of a thought experiment). 
The critical form of problem formulation is to 
challenge a deep-rooted theoretical domain or 
research programme. In both these cases, anal-
ogy selection is driven by relevance to the prob-
lem at hand. Ketokivi and colleagues (2017, p. 
645) approach the relevance of an analogy in 
the following way:
When we ask, ‘Is the analogy relevant?’ the aim is 
specifically to evaluate whether the analogy 
offers an a priori plausible solution to a theoretical 
problem (Bartha, 2010). Does the analogy enable 
inferences that help us make sense of an 
organizational phenomenon, by offering either an 
explanation of why it happened or an interpretation 
of what it could mean?
The type of analogy employed in a thought 
experiment rests on the function of the thought 
experiment – whether it is conducted creatively 
to open new theoretical frontiers, or critically in 
interrogating existing theory. In the creative 
function, a heuristic type of analogy would seem 
appropriate as researchers are examining a 
new problem. In case of a critical thought 
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experiment, existing theory-based analogies are 
put to the test in a thought experiment to investi-
gate their boundaries. It would seem, however, 
that they too need to be translated into a heuris-
tic form through contrastive reasoning. For 
instance, organizational identity theory is 
founded on the constitutive analogy of an organ-
ization as a psychological being with a personal 
history, core beliefs and values (Cornelissen, 
2005). Such an analogy is too broad to yield to a 
specific thought experiment, and will require 
contrastive reasoning (Cornelissen & Durand, 
2014; Tsang & Ellsaesser, 2011) specific to a 
case. Established research programmes can be 
expected to store auxiliary analogies that will 
provide conventional ways for such translation 
(Lakatos, 1976).
Let us illustrate the use of abductive reason-
ing in looking for an analogy to act as a basis 
for a thought experiment. As we write this paper 
in the spring of 2020, a large proportion of the 
world’s workforce is staying home due to the 
Covid-19 pandemic. Let us use this untypical 
circumstance to set up a problem: What hap-
pens to work if the home office and distributed 
organizations become the new normal? While 
examples of distributed organization go back 
centuries to volunteer-based social movements 
(Seidel & Stewart, 2011), and the advent of 
social media has generated new types of organi-
zations such as online communities (Faraj, 
Jarvenpaa, & Majchrzak, 2011), the mainstream 
organization for our field is a physically co-
located bureaucracy, heralded by the creation of 
industrial production and state bureaucracies. 
As expressed elegantly as ‘solid green areas’ in 
Simon’s thought experiment, organizations 
(firms in Simon’s case) are envisioned as being 
‘bounded’, in terms of a boundary between an 
organization and its environment (the market in 
Simon’s case). The question of ‘what is organi-
zation X’ is in many ways captured by ‘where 
do the boundaries of organization X lie?’ 
(Santos & Eisenhardt, 2005). Within such 
boundaries, organizations have, in Simon’s 
terms, ‘interior contours’, i.e. structure.
In the current Covid-19 crisis, the ‘struc-
tured togetherness’ is challenged as boundaries 
are blurred. How can an organization be con-
ceived that does not rely on structured together-
ness? How can coordinated action between 
several people be described in other terms? We 
are not the first to ask this question, and will 
certainly not be the last; a thought experiment 
requires a problem but that problem does not 
need to be uniquely novel.
Now that a problem, or at least a problem 
area, has been identified, let us look for a novel 
analogy. Strong abduction involves the com-
parison between several options. One option 
would be to look for a blended analogy 
(Cornelissen & Werner, 2014) such as a ‘virtual 
choir’. One of the hallmarks of a good analogy 
is familiarity (Ketokivi et al., 2017), however, 
and virtual choirs are new experiences and not 
yet familiar to many. The process of examining 
these and other musical metaphors also makes 
us realize that perhaps the problem itself is not 
as well formulated as we initially thought. This 
forces the thought experimenter – in this case, 
us – to focus on work in particular, and look at 
the phenomenon of the weakening social rela-
tionship between manager and subordinate.
The lack of physical proximity and the 
boundaries of private homes make basic forms 
of controlling employees’ performance and clan 
control very difficult (Ouchi, 1980). In distrib-
uted work settings, managers cannot observe 
how, when and where subordinates do their 
work, nor are they able to be as effective to use 
peer pressure through the cultivation of shared 
values and norms as electronic media severely 
limit rituals and ceremonies which are essential 
for the creation of culture. What remains is the 
control of work outputs which can be effec-
tively done in distributed settings. A focus on 
output control in turn incentivizes the develop-
ment and implementation of performance met-
rics, where ‘numbers don’t lie’.
This compels us to sketch the following 
thought experiment: What if a manager would 
become a rent collector, taking a new spin on 
Ouchi’s classical problem. Such specification 
of the problem with the abductive search for an 
analogy is characteristic of abductive reason-
ing more broadly (Alvesson & Kärreman, 
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2007). Our thought experiment focuses on the 
aspect of control in organizing work in a dis-
tributed organization. It focuses on delivera-
bles and a dyadic relationship between a worker 
and the manager as a representative of the 
employer. It focuses on the solitary aspect of 
work, and on outcome control in the absence of 
managerial performance or clan control. The 
transactional relationship between labour con-
tract parties is elevated and the social, cultural 
and political aspects of organization become 
ornamental at best. Digitally charged Fordist 
managers that reverse-colonialize the home are 
rewarded for measuring, incentivizing and 
extracting outputs from individuals working 
from home. It is easy, following this line of rea-
soning, to extrapolate to a panoptic setting 
where the job of the manager will be handled 
more ‘effectively’, and ‘impartially’ by an AI, 
perhaps even a digital character such as the 
agents in the movie The Matrix.
The experiment also allows for the develop-
ment of future scenarios. For instance, in our 
field of work, what if clever machine learning 
programmes record and analyse the myriad of 
online meetings and teaching sessions and learn 
to conduct them through AI? The machine 
might have no problem teaching introductory 
courses based on textbooks that summarize 
codifed (!) knowledge of (say) OB. The machine 
might also be able to anticipate discussion of 
cases and Q&As. The interesting question for 
the thought experimeter would be: where or 
when would AI stop being able to replace a pro-
fessor? What are the unique aspects to our roles 
for which even a ‘digital manager’ would need 
to return to us and seek that which has become 
considered ornamental?
Reflecting upon the design of a thought 
experiment more generally, the step following 
the abductive search for an analogy is to examine 
how generative the chosen analogy actually is by 
looking at how many structural similarities it 
shares with the phenomenon at hand: how much 
can the image of a Fordist manager actually pre-
dict when it comes to managing a distributed 
organization?  That is, the thought experimenter 
will focus on the structural soundness (Ketokivi 
et al., 2017) of the analogy by examining struc-
tural similarities between the problem domain 
and the analogy. Analogical reasoning focuses 
not just on similarity of properties, but also on 
the similarity of a presupposed causal structure 
(Gentner & Holyoak, 1997). What this means is 
that a generative analogy does not predict the 
discovery of new similar properties in the prob-
lem domain, but rather similar ways of function-
ing. To use a water distribution system as an 
analogy for an airport, the power of the analogy 
comes, not from finding that masses of people 
are like water or the walls of airport corridors are 
like pipes, but rather from the possibility of pre-
dicting that people move in various parts of the 
airport as if they were water flowing through bot-
tlenecks (see Ketokivi et al., 2017). To use the 
Fordist digital manager as an analogy highlights 
the possibility that knowledge workers create 
value in their private ‘lockdown bubbles’ and 
that rather intrusive, holistic (not to say total) 
forms of power ensure extraction of value.
Thought experiments can be evaluated by 
the relevance of their core analogy, the genera-
tivity of the structural connectedness between 
the analogy and problem setting, as well as the 
completeness of the exploration of the scenario 
(i.e. are the relevant ‘what if’ questions identi-
fied and explored by the experimenter?). 
Cooper (2005) argues that the difference 
between thought experiments and daydreams or 
science fiction is the ‘rigour’ with which the 
thought experimenter tries to answer the ‘what 
if’ question. She has to consider all conse-
quences of the thought experiment and follow 
them through – resulting in an internally con-
sistent model (Cooper, 2005) which might be a 
set of propositions, a graphical representation, a 
scenario or something similar that captures the 
‘what if’ in a coherent manner. For instance, 
Simon’s thought experiment ends with suggest-
ing another possible description of the world, 
one that might be conducive to ask new ques-
tions. For organization theory this opens up the 
possibility to be engaged, perhaps even rele-
vant, without being normative.
More mature analogies will also be evaluated 
based on accumulated knowledge of their factual 
Kornberger and Mantere 11
validity (Ketokivi et al., 2017), but this requires 
empirical evidence and thus cannot be done 
exhaustively from within the thought experiment 
itself (unless significant secondary data exists for 
some reason). Indeed, this is where the thought 
experiment stops – it does not tell us whether the 
‘what if’ is true – it only tells us that it is possible; 
it generates a question, and reasons to think with, 
but it does not provide evidence. Here we see the 
obvious linkage to social sciences and their 
methods to probe the world further.
A further, crucial step is to narrate the thought 
experiment. The task of the thought experimenter 
involves spinning the case into a convincing nar-
rative form. While the connections within an ana-
logical inference can be examined in various 
different sequences, the sequence of events is 
absolutely crucial to narrative, as this accom-
plishes emplotment: the interconnected core 
sequence of events and their consequences 
(Polkinghorne, 1988). Also, the description of a 
thought experiment is ‘thick’; it contains contex-
tual detail that readers will need to understand in 
order to be convinced of the experiment (Folger & 
Turillo, 1999; Ryle, 1949). While established the-
ories and especially models tend to be ‘thin’ on 
contextual detail (Folger & Turillo, 1999), thought 
experiments tend to require richness and texture: 
Simon’s thought experiment is fleshed out by col-
ourful lines, mythical visitors, telescopes reveal-
ing social structures, and other details.
We will illustrate the task of narrating with 
Simon’s Martian example, applied to the con-
text of the sharing economy. 
Imagine a further visit from Simon’s Martian. Since 
his last sojourn in 1991 he knows that we are above 
anything else an organization society. Now he looks 
at our planet, and sees the familiar set of red and 
green colours depicting markets and hierarchies; 
yet he also sees significant amounts of blue popping 
up across the globe. Blue shows platforms, peer to 
peer networks, open source, distributed innovation 
systems as well as other ecosystems in which users 
share excess resources with each other. The Martian 
is puzzled by the fact that since his last visit, the 
biggest retailer is no longer Walmart but Alibaba 
(carrying no stock), the biggest accommodation 
provider is not the Hilton Group but Airbnb 
(owning no property), and the biggest mobility 
provider is not some airline or train company but 
Uber (owning no cars).4
The Martian is astonished by these new 
organizational designs that operate as platform 
businesses. They mediate between demand and 
supply – akin to analogue examples such as 
shopping centre operators, credit cards or 
classified ads in newspapers. But the Martian is 
puzzled by the fact that we describe these 
ecosystems as ‘sharing economy’: after all, Uber, 
Airbnb or Alibaba are market-makers that 
organize exchange between supply and demand 
for a fee; they share little, and gift nothing. Yet the 
Martian also observes other platforms – such as 
Wikipedia – in which sharing does seem to take 
place: here knowledge is being shared and this 
seems to express sharing as in a sharing of values 
or a sharing of trust. What is shared is in fact not 
diminished through use but grows through the 
fact of being shared. A shared language is more 
valuable than a private language: the more 
distributed language becomes, the more valuable 
it is. Paradoxically, here consumption seems to be 
a subtle form of production. Scarcity is not the 
main issue, and free-riders turn into welcome 
disseminators. Crowds, peer networks, open 
source communities and all sorts of other social 
movements seem to be at the heart of this 
economic activity. The Martian wonders how the 
organization and governance of such genuine 
sharing ecosystems differs from resource 
exchange platforms. What does it mean to manage 
such sharing ecosystems? And how could 
management itself be shared within these 
ecosystems? 
These and other questions would flow from the 
concrete emplotment of a thought experiment.
Implications for 
Organizational Research
Creating thick concepts
In the previous section we argued that thought 
experiments are a genuine philosophical method. 
Thought experiments pose ‘what-makes-it-pos-
sible’ questions (Abend, 2019, p. 9) – a keystone 
in the arch that connects philosophical inquiry 
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and the social sciences, including organization 
theory. We argue that the corollary of thought 
experiments is a specific kind of conceptual 
work that produces what Ryle (2009) and more 
recently, Abend (2019) described as ‘thick con-
cepts’. Thick concepts are one result of thought 
experiments, as Simon (1991) suggested with 
his visitor from Mars: ‘organizational econ-
omy’ might be a more appropriate concept to 
describe reality; and this conceptual difference 
matters as the
name can affect the order in which we describe its 
institutions, and the order of description can 
affect the theory. In particular, it may strongly 
affect our choice of the variables that are 
important enough to be included in a first-order 
theory of the phenomena. (to quote Simon again)
Note that thought experiments do not result in 
abstract theory; nor do they reveal new empirical 
data: rather, it is the emerging relation between 
thought and phenomenon which we characterize 
as ‘thick concepts’, i.e. theoretically relevant con-
cepts infused with new descriptive and prescrip-
tive insight. Imagining scenarios as the thought 
experimenter does creates thick concepts that are 
rich in texture and detail. The puzzled Martian that 
revisits us in 2020 is a generative figure of inquiry 
as the unfolding narrative suggest conceptual 
implications and practical applications that other, 
perhaps more traditional forms of theorizing or 
empirical investigation, do not provide.
Building on Ryle’s (2009) notion of ‘thick 
descriptions’ (later popularized by Geertz), 
Abend (2019) developed the notion of thick 
concepts further. He argued that thick concepts 
are both descriptive and evaluative. For 
instance, good or bad are purely evaluative, not 
descriptive concepts; cruel or compassionate, 
however, are both descriptive and evaluative; 
bad behaviour can consist of a whole array of 
actions all judged to be bad; cruel behaviour 
describes a more specific set of behaviours and 
evaluates them negatively. Thick concepts are 
important as they
figure in societies’ laws and other written and 
unwritten norms, e.g., the ethics codes of trade 
associations and companies. They might also 
figure in societies’ practices, ideas, culture, and 
institutions, e.g., political and public policy 
projects, advertising campaigns, job descriptions, 
awards, rankings, categories and classifications, 
education, movies, and art. (Abend, 2019, p. 7)
‘Digital Fordist manager’, used above in our 
example, is a thick concept which specifies cer-
tain aspects pertaining to that role, combined with 
sentiments about the implications of such roles in 
the post-pandemic work life. It is a dystopian 
view of the direction that virtual work can take. 
We also see the importance of thick concepts 
when we use terms such as ‘sharing economy’ or 
‘platform organization’, as in the example above: 
the sharing economy does not only denote a spe-
cific resource allocation model, but includes con-
notations of open, entrepreneurial if not 
democratic and inclusive (see Gillespie, 2010; 
Kornberger, Leixnering, Meyer, & Höllerer, 
2018). Just think of the discussion on whether 
Uber is a taxi company exploiting cheap labour or 
an empowering technology provider (Pujadas & 
Curto-Millet, 2019); here thick concepts of what 
makes an organization collide, with significant 
implications for stakeholders across society. 
Thus, thick concepts matter because they describe 
and evaluate phenomena: they express facts and 
values. Words do things, Austin (1955/1962) told 
us; thick concepts do things in specific ways by 
conjuring up facts and values about the world in 
which we live.
Thought experiments (which Abend, 2019, 
mentions explicitly as method) represent a gen-
uine philosophical style of inquiry that aims at 
creating and critically testing thick concepts: 
the question is not how concepts are used by 
individuals (as in psychology) nor how they are 
deployed in societies (as sociology would do) 
– but to inquire about the logical conditions of 
their possibility (Abend, 2019, p. 6). This 
important work is conducted through thought 
experiments. Thus we propose that one key 
Kornberger and Mantere 13
deliverable of philosophical work in our field is 
to develop thick concepts in order to extend our 
analytical vocabulary with which we grasp new 
phenomena. To be sure, philosophy has 
moments in which it is needed more than in oth-
ers. Especially as we witness the rise of new 
phenomena (such as radically enforced home-
office working, the sharing economy or plat-
form organization) our epistemological maps 
are challenged and might need readjustment. As 
a Rylian cartographer, the philosopher concerns 
herself necessarily with such rugged or shifting 
landscapes, i.e. with undisciplined, ill-defined 
and disruptive problems. She addresses prob-
lems before they are being disciplined and dealt 
with in specialized disciplines including psy-
chology, sociology or economics. The philoso-
pher’s task is to reduce a puzzle to a problem 
that then can be researched using a whole spec-
trum of methods available in specialized fields 
(Ryle, 2009). Thus, Ryle suggests that philoso-
phy is occupied with the discovery of new prob-
lems; it is less well equipped to solve old ones. 
Once the ‘unit of analysis’ is defined (Bacharach, 
1989), the philosopher’s task has come to an 
end and the social scientist commences. 
Importantly, this stance implies that philosophy 
is a moment that is not the sole privilege of the 
philosopher as Ryle posits: ‘A scientist who 
ceases for a moment to try to solve his ques-
tions in order to inquire instead why he poses 
them or whether they are the right questions to 
pose ceases for the time to be a scientist and 
becomes a philosopher’ (Ryle, 2009, p. 204). 
Philosophy is but a moment in an ongoing 
thought process, Ryle reminds us, not a fixed 
state of mind: you do not philosophize from 9 to 
5, but in between the cracks that doubt and 
imagination open between 5 and 9. This implies 
for better or worse that philosophy can never be 
a normal science in the sense of Kuhn. There 
are no results and no findings; only search and 
discovery. As Ryle put it, the philosopher 
throws new light but does not give any new 
information (2009, p. 174). Here we touch 
again on the thought experiment’s specific 
value: it does not reveal new information, yet it 
is a critical and creative source of new ideas and 
knowledge. Figure 1 summarizes our argument 
and sketches the relation between thick concep-
tual work and thought experiment vis-a-vis 
other modes of inquiry.
We depict thought experiments and thick 
concepts as part of a continuum within organi-
zational research: philosophy is about develop-
ing and clarifying thick concepts that provide 
basic literacy to make sense of hitherto undisci-
plined, rugged landscapes; over time, these 
concepts might evolve into theories that are 
then subject to qualitative inquiry and quantita-
tive testing. As Abend (2019, p. 9) proposes, we 
may ‘start with thick concept and property, and 
then ask what it’s enabled by or dependent on. 
Or start with a small network of interrelated 
thick concepts and then ask what it’s enabled by 
or dependent on.’ Hence, philosophical work is 
Figure 1. Division of labour between conceptual and empirical work.
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not empirical; rather it is concerned with con-
cepts that organize the empirical. For Ryle this 
important organization work happens neither in 
the library (the mind) nor the laboratory (the 
world), but only in interaction between them – 
and this ‘coordination is done neither in librar-
ies nor in laboratories but in the philosopher’s 
head’ (Ryle, 2009, p. 204). The philosopher’s 
head, we add, is the metaphorical locus of the 
thought experiment.
The continuum depicted in Figure 1 is com-
mitted to a processual view. Indeed, we do not 
suggest a linear development from thought 
experimental ideation to theory and empirical 
substantiation. Thought experiments are forms 
of meta-theorizing (especially following their 
critical function); but they are also a means for 
ongoing reflection and evolution of established 
theory and method contributing to evolving 
bodies of knowledge in research programmes 
within organization theory. In other words, 
thought experiments generate new concepts and 
rehydrate or eliminate old ones. They help the-
ory adapt to changing organizational practice, 
challenging institutional beliefs and acknowl-
edging innovations. The results of generative 
thought experiments might grow stale with time, 
and are subjected to more critical thought exper-
iments that provide space for new ideas. By 
extension, we do not suggest a division of labour 
between philosophically inclined thought exper-
imenters, theoreticians and empirical fieldwork-
ers. Rather, the value-add of thought experiments 
is manifest at every stage of organizational 
research, improving our conceptual repertoire 
(e.g. what do we mean by sharing?) and our 
methodological designs (e.g. what variables 
account for an organizational economy?).
Philosophical reasoning and 
organizational research
As an empirical discipline, organization theory 
has excelled at gathering data and data analysis 
using ever more sophisticated methods. The price 
organization theory may have paid is to leave 
engagement with practice to consultants and 
gurus and be perceived as insignificant and 
irrelevant when it comes to real-world problems 
(let alone so-called ‘grand challenges’). In short, 
the current vocabulary of organization theory is 
designed for empirical scrutiny rather than practi-
cal engagement. Equally, our theorizing tends to 
be self-referential, often more concerned with 
gap-spotting than genuine intellectual puzzles. 
We propose a remedy: the creative and critical 
functions explain how the thought experiment is 
a practical mode of ‘doing’ the sort of thick con-
ceptual work that Ryle suggested. Thought exper-
iments are about ‘foreign relations’ as they 
investigate conceptual boundaries and trace pos-
sible ‘implication threads’ in rugged, not yet dis-
ciplined landscapes (Ryle, 2009). Such 
philosophical reasoning plays an important role 
as we experience quite a few rugged landscapes 
in our world of organizations. Take once again 
the notion of the sharing economy as an example. 
Much has been made of its potential to address 
grand challenges, reduce overconsumption and 
reintroduce a sense of community in economic 
organization. While empirical studies map the 
sharing economy in quantitative terms (see Wruk, 
Oberg, Klutt, & Maurer, 2019), a philosophical 
inquiry would start by mapping its implication 
threads: what are the differences and similarities 
between sharing and other forms of exchange, 
such as organized by Uber or Wikipedia? How do 
these forms of exchange configure economic 
organization, individual preferences and collec-
tive behaviours? How do novel organizational 
forms for sharing relate different elements (con-
sumers, producers, tasks, control, governance, 
decision-making, . . .) with each other? And how 
do moral implications of sharing interlock with 
economic aspects of the sharing economy and its 
political implications? Thought experiments can 
tease out such conceptual differences and open 
up, critically and creatively, debates about alter-
native socio-economic organization. Done well 
we will be able to develop concepts that expose 
unique relationships between elements that will 
in turn allow us to shine the torchlight of empiri-
cal inquiry onto them. We will conjure up thick 
concepts that are descriptive and evaluative. Such 
inquiry seeks to develop a conceptual apparatus 
that is not based on archetypes or ‘novel new 
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theory’ (as Barley put it); rather it aims to develop 
thick concepts that are agile, more like speed-
boats compared to theories akin to aircraft carri-
ers. Concepts are nimble, fast, focused on 
discovery of new relations on the phenomenon 
level. They are about literacy: that is, providing 
the critical vocabulary needed to understand and 
map rugged landscapes.
In this sense, the proposed thought experimen-
tal approach complements other methods such as 
Weick’s (1989) disciplined imagination, Alvesson 
and Sandberg’s (2011) critical problematizations 
or counterfactual reasoning. Adding to these 
methodological tools, thought experiments are 
structured ways to creatively and critically inves-
tigate the conceptual infrastructure that informs 
much of the empirical work in the field. Thought 
experiments are one way to add methodological 
rigour to conceptual work through (1) helping to 
discover and communicate novel concepts and (2) 
critically evaluate concepts. They are useful as 
they support fast and agile thinking that often 
takes a narrative – and hence engaging – form. 
Organization theory might benefit from such con-
ceptual work; and perhaps it would not lose too 
much if it left some of the grand theorizing to 
focused disciplines with deep traditions and 
policed borders. Indeed, we see the possible value 
of organization theory in being undisciplined, 
hosting conversations that bring together special-
ists (from AI to anthropology, etc.) and seek reso-
nance between these conversations and real-world 
problems. Thinking conceptually and through 
thought experiments are tools to advance this 
endeavour, with rigour and relevance.
A key goal of this essay is to demonstrate 
that conceptual work is methodologically 
informed: since legitimacy in science is based 
to a large degree on transparent methods 
(Luhmann, 1969), it is important to show that 
conceptual work is not the antithesis of meth-
odologically driven research. Undisciplined 
does not mean unguided. Moreover we are not 
suggesting that thought experiments can or 
should replace empirical inquiry. Indeed, sev-
eral writers have lamented the monopoly of 
thought experimentation, particularly in fields 
such as the philosophy of the mind or ethics, as 
empirical knowledge would sometimes be a 
better alternative to often abstract or simplified 
imagined scenarios. With this caveat in mind, 
we claim a place for thought experiments in our 
field – a place that has been left vacant to date.
Conclusion
In the dedication to his book Exit, Voice and 
Loyalty, the philosopher-economist Hirschman 
(1970) thanked his friend Eugenio Colorni ‘who 
taught [him] about small ideas and how they may 
grow’. We claim that it is exactly the ability of 
thought experiments to seed small ideas (thick 
concepts) that may – nourished by interaction 
with other disciplines and empirical investigation 
– grow big. We suggest that organization theory 
is a good host for such philosophical reasoning as 
its main proponents – Follett, Penrose, March, 
Mintzberg, Weick, to name a few – have been 
very much at home between the library and the 
laboratory. As Barley (2016, p. 4) wrote:
Reportedly, Jim [March] once gave a qualifying 
exam composed of single question: ‘Name one 
paper that has made a theoretical contribution to 
organizational theory that also included a 
regression equation.’ The question was brilliant 
and carries more than a grain of truth. If you look 
at the most-cited scholars in our field, you will 
find that their most highly cited papers are almost 
always primarily theoretical.
Now we may place ourselves in the midst of 
a thought experiment and sit March’s exam. Of 
course, March was right; the most cited papers 
in our field are conceptual pieces such as his 
seminal paper on exploration and exploitation. 
Note that he did not present a theory but a pair of 
thick concepts to think with. Rather, when it 
comes to theory development, organization the-
ory has been a net importer of theories, mainly 
from sociology (as Barley (2016, p. 7) says en 
passant, ‘organizational theory’ is equivalent to 
‘organizational sociology’) and psychology. In 
return, organization theory has not exported 
much theory to other disciplines; even shifts 
such as the behavioural turn in economics are 
fuelled by psychology, not organization theory. 
16 Organization Theory 
So perhaps March’s exam prompts us to find a 
middle way between grand (social) theory and 
empiricism, pointing towards work with thick 
concepts that is genuinely driven from within 
organization theory – not derivative theorizing 
that makes organization theory a sub-branch of 
sociology. This would make organization theory 
the host of an interdisciplinary dialogue fostered 
through thought experiments that ‘represent a 
rare four-way intersection of history, philoso-
phy, cognitive science and social science’ (Stuart 
et al., 2018: p. xx). And it would include an 
impact-driven agenda that does not shy away 
from Hirschmanian possibilism, for thought 
experiments are ‘attempts to construct models 
of possible worlds’ (Cooper, 2005). Thought 
experiments tell possible world stories that 
engage and invite imagination – and this is what 
some of our field’s best work is known for. We 
firmly believe that there is a need for such work: 
a whole array of new actors populate organiza-
tional landscapes, from algorithms to crowds, 
from platforms to open source networks, while 
unprecedented challenges, small and grand, 
mushroom all around us. Social sciences and 
organization theory among them embark on sur-
veying these new landscapes; in their efforts 
organizational researchers may well build on 
philosophical reasoning, aided by thought 
experiments, that charts these landscapes first.
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Notes
1. We thank Christopher Kitson for pointing this 
out.
2. The trolley problem is a thought experiment 
in ethics: Imagine a runaway trolley is moving 
down a railway track. On the track, five people 
are caught and the trolley is heading straight for 
them, probably killing all of them. Now you can 
pull a lever an divert the trolley to another track. 
But on this other track there is one person who 
will be run over and killed by the train in case 
you decide to divert it. The question is: is it ethi-
cal to do nothing and let me trolley continue on 
its track to kill five people; or should you inter-
vene, killing the one person on the other track? 
The thought experiment highlights two different 
approaches to ethics: a utilitarian view would 
stipulate that one has the moral obligation to 
minimize harm and hence one has to divert the 
train – even if one’s actions lead to the death 
of an innocent person. A deontologist position 
would argue the opposite: life is incommensura-
ble (five lives are not five times more valuable 
than one life) and participating in a wrong cre-
ates responsibility where there was none before. 
These questions are highly relevant today (for 
instance in the design of autonomous vehicles).
3. Wittgenstein’s beetle in the box is a thought 
experiment in which everyone has a box that 
only they can see into. Each person describes 
what they see in the box as a ‘beetle’. The point 
is that each box might contain something dif-
ferent (perhaps even something continuously 
changing) yet nonetheless everyone might call 
it ‘beetle’ (Wittgenstein, 1969). The thought 
experiment highlights that language is not gov-
erned by introspection; rather, for it to be mean-
ingful, language needs to shared among a public.
 Nagel’s thought experiment asks what it is like to be 
a bat; arguing for the subjective character of experi-
ence the thought experiment shows that we might 
be able to imagine eating what a bat eats, hanging 
upside down from trees, flying, and using sonar 
(instead of vision) to navigate; but we still would not 
know a bat’s mindset, only its behaviours.
4. This list is in reference to Tom Goodwin who 
said: ‘Uber, the world’s largest taxi company, 
owns no vehicles. Facebook, the world’s 
most popular media owner, creates no con-
tent. Alibaba, the most valuable retailer, has 
no inventory. And Airbnb, the world’s largest 
accommodation provider, owns no real estate. 
Something interesting is happening.’ The state-
ment circulates as a quote on the web but we 
were not able to identify its origin.
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